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ABSTRACT 
B2B auctions play a key role in a firm’s procurement process. 
Even though it is known that repetition is a key characteristic of 
procurement auctions, traditional auctioneers typically have not 
put in place a suitable mechanism that supports repetitive auctions 
effectively. In this paper, we empirically investigate what has 
taken place in repeated procurement auctions based on real world 
data from a major outsourcing company of MRO (Maintenance, 
Repair and Operations) items in Korea. From this empirical study, 
we discovered the followings. First, we discovered that the 
repeated bidders contribute majority of all bids, and that the 
number of new entrants declined significantly as time passes. 
Second, repeated bidders become inactive and virtually leave the 
market, particularly if they fail to win in the auctions even though 
their bid prices were competitive. This implies that repeated 
bidders with lower winning rates have a higher possibility of 
becoming inactive. Third, the number of bidders along with the 
purchase amount and the bidder’s previous winning rates are 
critical factors in determining both the winning bid price in the 
auction level and the bid price of each bidder.  According to these 
research findings, we recognize that retaining a sufficient number 
of repeated bidders is crucial in the repeated procurement auction 
market. This motivates auctioneers to provide incentives to the 
repeated bidders to retain them in future auctions. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
H.1.2 [Information Systems]: User/Machine Systems – Human 
factors. J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral 
Sciences – economics. 
General Terms 
Theory, Verification. 
Keywords 
Repeated bidding, repeated bidder, procurement auctions, bid 
pricing behavior. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Online auctions have been a major pricing mechanism in B2B 
procurement, and they have been used to procure billions of parts 
and services in the private and government sectors (Jap 2007).  
Beall et. al. (2003) stated that the potential applicability of 
auctions by aggressive users could be as high as half of their 
annual procurement, and most likely about 10 – 15% on average.   
The auction mechanism that is widely used in procurement 
process is the first-price sealed bid reverse auction, whose main 
objective is to reduce the cost of one time purchase.  Studies 
conducted in the early stage of B2B auctions reported a high 
effect of cost reduction from auctions.  For instance, Cohn (2000) 
reported 15% procurement cost savings, and Smart and Harrison 
(2003) reported the case of Airco Company achieving 30% 
reduction of its stationery procurement. These results far exceeded 
their expectation at that time. However, the concern of the present 
study lies in whether the effectiveness of auctions can be 
sustained as auctions repeat. Pinker et. al. (2003) pointed out that 
repetition is the key aspect of procurement auctions as they are 
often conducted yearly, quarterly or even daily. 
In this research, we empirically investigate what has transpired in 
the real world of repeated procurement auctions in terms of 
bidders’ behavior. Since the first-price sealed bid reverse auction 
mechanism was originally designed for spot sourcing without 
considering the nature of repeated procurement, we evaluate 
bidder’s behaviors in a repeated procurement setting to justify the 
need for new auction mechanisms which are suitable for repeated 
auctions. 
There have been very few empirical studies on repeated 
procurement auctions. Ishii (2009), Porter and Zona (1993) 
studied the issues of bidder collusion in repeated auctions of 
public work and highway construction respectively. Jofre-Bonet 
and Pesendorfer (2000) studied the capacity constraint effect on 
the bid price in the case of a highway construction auction. Zong 
and Wu (2006) and Goes et. al. (2010) proved that information 
learned from previous auction influence the bid prices of 
subsequent rounds. However, no empirical study has yet 
investigated the overall phenomena of repeated procurement 
auctions to improve the performance of frequently repeated B2B 
procurements.  
In this study, we investigate several research questions that affect 
the auctioneer’s procurement performance in a repeated auction 
setting regarding bidder behaviors.  
First, what is the contribution of repeated bidders in repeated 
auctions? 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, 
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. 
ICEC '12, Aug 07-08 2012, Singapore, Singapore 
ACM 978-1-4503-1197-7/12/08. 
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If a small number of repeated bidders cover most bids, then 
repeated bidders should be treated more carefully in order to 
maintain the effectiveness of auctions. This aspect of SRM 
(Supplier Relationship Management) is the same as the repeated 
buyers in CRM (Customer Relationship Management). In this 
regard, we need to verify whether the Pareto principle (i.e., the 
80-20 rule) applies to repeated procurement auctions. Another 
issue that we need to examine carefully is the number of new 
entrant bidders in the market. According to Daly and Nath (2005), 
most industries have a limited number of incumbents and a 
limited number of potential entrants. Given a limited number of 
new entrants in repeated auctions, retaining repeated bidders is 
very crucial to the auctioneer in terms of keeping the bidding 
prices low. 
Second, why do some repeated bidders become inactive? 
Since retaining existing bidders is important, we need to ascertain 
how many bidders become inactive, which means they never 
submit bids after having participated in a certain number of 
auctions. We also need to know why they become inactive, so that 
we can propose a new mechanism of retaining existing bidders. 
To answer this question, we focus our attention on repeated 
bidders, because their contribution to the auction performance is 
critical in repeated procurement. The auctioneer needs to know 
how many repeated bidders have left the auction market and the 
reason why in order to improve the procurement performance. 
Third, what are the major determinants of the winning bid price of 
the auction and the individual bidder’s bid price? 
We need to analyze how bidders decide their bid prices in 
repeated auctions. Each bidder’s bid price will determine the final 
winning price of the auction. To reduce procurement cost, the 
auctioneer needs to identify the major factors that determine 
winning bid price of each auction. Although there are many 
factors that affect the bid price, we consider the factors that can be 
obtained by the auctioneer from historical data of auctions in this 
study. We particularly pay attention to the effect of the number of 
participating bidders on the winning bid price. 
The impact of the number of bidders on auction performance has 
been addressed in many previous studies. Bulow and Klemperer 
(1996) noted that an increased number of bidders may raise price 
competition and cost savings for the auctioneer. Hence, keeping a 
sufficient number of bidders is critical to lower the bid price and 
eventually reducing the procurement cost for the auctioneer 
(Tenorio 1993). In this regard, we need to investigate bidders’ bid 
pricing behavior. Since repeatedly participating bidders maintain 
the competition, they should be retained so that they will 
participate in future auctions. 
To answer the above research questions, we conducted an 
empirical study with real auction data from the largest 
procurement outsourcing company in Korea. An outsourcing 
company can utilize a group purchasing mechanism to make 
auctions more attractive to bidders. The sourcing companies play 
the role of auctioneer to purchase on behalf of their clients. The 
major B2B sourcing companies in Korea - iMarketKorea, 
ServeOne, eN2B - work in this manner too. Based on the results 
of this empirical study, we propose requirements for a sustainable 
auction mechanism for repeated auctions in procurement in 
another paper (Park et al. 2008).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
empirically shows that most bids are submitted by a small number 
of repeated bidders in repeated auctions and the phenomenon of 
limited new entrants. Section 3 describes why repeated bidders 
become inactive. Section 4 develops a bid pricing model and 
illustrates the importance of retaining repeated bidders. Based on 
the results of the empirical study, a sustainable auction 
mechanism for repeated auctions is discussed in Section 5. 
Section 6 concludes with limitation of the study and directions for 
future study.   
 
2. CONCENTRATION ON REPEATED 
BIDDERS AND LIMITED NEW ENTRANTS 
2.1 Data Collection 
To investigate the current phenomena in repeated auctions under 
the traditional auction mechanism which is first price, sealed bid 
reverse auction, we obtained auction data from the leading 
procurement outsourcing company in Korea, iMarketKorea 
(IMK). The auction service started in 2001 and we obtained a data 
set from 2001 to 2007 for the study. During the period, about 
2,000 auctions were conducted every year. The trading volume is 
about 200 billion won (about US$160 million) per year, and a 
roughly 7% brokerage fee was charged. IMK deals with 293 item 
categories; 214 belong to MRO and the remainders are related to 
construction items. About 30% of the trading volume involved in 
MRO items. We use the MRO auction data and the data set covers 
the entire bidding history for each auction, including auction 
identification number, item and its category, purchase amount, 
bidders, bid prices, number of participating bidders, auction type 
and auction results. In procuring MRO items, IMK used the 
traditional auction mechanism, the first price, sealed bid auction, 
on their online auction site.  
2.2 Concentration on Repeated Bidders 
According to the well-known “Pareto principle”, we assumed that 
about 20 percent of repeated bidders generate 80 percent of bids. 
This bidder behavior is analogous to customer behavior. As the 
cost of retaining existing customers is considerably lower than the 
cost of acquiring new customers (Hart, Heskett and Sasser 1990; 
Reichheld and Sasser 1990), we expect that the cost of retaining 
repeated bidders will be less than the increased procurement cost 
without them. 
There are 214 MRO item categories in IMK data and each 
category has a different number of auctions. We defined the 
category with repeated auction, if the auction in the category had 
opened more than once per quarter.  
Only 31 categories (14% of all MRO categories) had opened 
auctions repeatedly, but the number of auctions by these 
categories covers 70% of auctions and their number of bid covers 
76% of bids. This means most client companies buy similar items 
from the MRO procurement outsourcing company.  
In this study, we operationally define a bidder as a ‘Repeated 
Bidder’ if the bidder has participated auctions repeatedly for more 
than a year. According to IMK data, 17% of bidders are repeated 
bidders and they cover 71% of all bids as summarized in Table 1. 
Therefore, Pareto principle exists in both repeated auctions and 
repeated bidders. According to the Table 1, repeated bidders 
participated in 31.9 auctions on average, while non-repeated 
bidders participated in 2.7 auctions on average. In general, 
repeated bidders participated in auctions at a rate 11 times higher 
than non-repeated bidders. Hence, special care is necessary to 
ensure that repeated bidders continue their biddings in upcoming 
auctions. 
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Table 1. Repeated Bidders 
 
All 
bidders 
(a) 
Repeated 
bidders 
(b) 
Non repeated 
bidders 
(c) 
Repeated 
bidders ratio 
(b/a) 
Number of 
bidders 1042 181 861 17% 
Number of 
bids 8135 5773 2362 71% 
 
2.3 Limited New Entrants 
Auctions perform well if there exist a sufficient number of bidders. 
To maintain a sufficient number of bidders, the role of potential 
entrants is critical. If there are a large number of potential entrants, 
the auctioneer may depend on new entrants to keep the price low. 
But this assumption is not realistic. According to Daly and Nath 
(2005), most industries have a limited number of incumbents and 
a limited number of potential entrants in procurement auctions. 
This hypothesis is validated by the IMK data, as Figure 1 shows, 
for the number of new entrants per year. 
 
Figure 1. Number of new entrants per year 
According to Figure 1, the number of new entrants drastically 
declined after the first year, and gradually declines as time passes 
although there is a slight ripple in a few new item categories. Thus 
we can conclude that there will be a limited number of new 
entrants after a few years of repeated auctions. In such a situation, 
retaining a sufficient number of existing bidders over time is 
critical for the auctioneer to keep procurement prices competitive. 
 
3. WHY SOME REPEATED BIDDERS 
BECOME INACTIVE  
With limited new entrants, the role of repeated bidders who 
contribute more than 70% of total bids is crucial to maintain the 
performance of auctions. Thus, the auctioneer has to retain 
repeated bidders over time. In this section, we study the 
participation behavior of repeated bidders over repeated auctions. 
A concern is that some repeated bidders stop participating after a 
certain number of attempts and never participate in auctions again. 
The auctioneer needs to know the reason why repeated bidders 
become inactive and leave the auctions. This phenomenon is 
analogous to CRM. For example, Peppers and Rogers (1993) 
pointed out that the majority of businesses were losing 25% of 
their original customers every year. Reicheld and Sasser (1990) 
proposed that businesses could gain 100% more profit by 
maintaining 5% of their old customers. SRM in a repeated auction 
context needs to pay similar attention to their bidders. 
There can be many possible reasons for bidders to become 
inactive and leave the auction market temporarily or permanently. 
Sometimes bankruptcy or shortage of inventory may be the 
reasons, but these data cannot be traced from the auction data and 
such factors cannot be monitored and controlled by the auctioneer 
either. However, the auctioneer can monitor the behavior that is 
related with bidders’ previous auction results. According to Riley 
and Samuelson (1981), repeated bidders become inactive when 
they have won the auctions less than they have expected or the 
expected winning probability is low. While Riley and Samuelson 
only provided conceptual findings in their research, our study 
attempts to empirically assess bidders’ behavior on leaving the 
market. 
In this regard, we classified repeated bidders in IMK into two 
categories: Active Bidders and Inactive Bidders. We define that a 
bidder as Active Bidder if the bidder has participated in more than 
a year. If a bidder stops participating in auctions and never returns 
during the rest study period, the bidder becomes Inactive Bidder.  
Using the IMK data, we compare the winning rate (number of 
wins / number of participations) between the active bidders and 
inactive bidders. Table 2 shows that the total number of repeated 
bidders is 181 and 30% of them (59 bidders) are inactive bidders. 
The average winning rate of active bidder is 0.30, while 0.21 for 
inactive bidder. The t-test indicates that, the winning rate of 
inactive bidders is significantly lower than that of active bidders. 
From this result, we can conclude that a low winning rate is one of 
the main reasons for repeated bidders to become inactive. This 
result confirms the Riley and Samuelson (1981) postulates. To 
maintain the performance of auctions in repeated procurements, 
the auctioneer needs to prevent the repeated bidders from being 
inactive. In particular, the repeated bidders who have submitted 
more competitive bid prices should be retained in order to 
enhance the auction performance.  
 Table 2. Comparison between Active and Inactive Bidders 
 
4. WINNING PRICE OF AUCTION AND 
BIDDER’S BID PRICE MODEL 
We study how the individual bidder determines the bid prices in 
repeated auctions, and how the winning prices of the auctions are 
determined. The bid price is modelled at bidder layer, while the 
winning price at auction layer.  
For this study, we selected the item A4 sheets from the copy paper 
category. This item is particularly selected because it has 
standardized specifications and it is a frequently auctioned good. 
In other MRO categories, the products’ specifications vary even 
though they belong to the same category. Different specifications 
cause large price variance. Thus, they cannot be used for price 
modelling. The study with the relative prices of all items will be 
conducted and analyzed in the next paper. The selected A4 data is 
used for the study of two models:  Winning Bid Pricing Model 
and individual Bid Pricing Model.  
 N 
Average 
winning 
rate 
t value Degree of freedom 
p value 
(Two tails) 
Active 
bidders 
122 0.30 
-2.678 179 0.008 
Inactive 
bidders 
59 0.21 
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The sample auction data consists of 102 auctions with 366 bids 
from 29 bidders. Their auction type is the traditional reverse 
auction with the first price sealed bid rule. Data from the 6 
repeated bidders are used to study the bidder’s pricing behaviour.  
 
4.1 Bid Pricing Model  
Many factors can influence the bid price of an auction, such as the 
bidder’s cost function (Hao 2000), capacity and inventory level 
(Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer 2000), competitors’ cost function 
(Hao 2000), previous auction results (Goes et al. 2010, Zhong and 
Wu 2006, Neugebauer and Selten 2006) as well as purchasing 
amount (Viswanathan and Wang 2003) and number of 
participating bidders of the current auction (Smart and Harrison 
2003, Bulow and Klemperer 1996, and Tenorio 1993).  
For each factor, the information holder is different and some 
information is not revealed to other auction participants 
strategically. In this study, our purpose is to model the bid pricing 
from the auctioneer layer as well as bidder layer. Figure 2 depicts 
the model of determining the winning bid price and individual 
bidder’s bid price.  
 
 
Figure 2. Analysis model of bid prices 
For the dependent variable, we use the winning bid price of the 
auction or each bidder’s bid price. In the A4 sheet case, the bid 
price implies the unit price.  
4.1.1 Auction Layer  
In the auction layer, we expect that the winning bid price will 
decrease as the purchase amount increases, due to the volume 
discount effect (Viswanathan and Wang 2003) as well as 
economy of scales. To reconfirm the traditional volume discount 
effect in the repeated auction context, we test the hypothesis (H1a) 
that the purchase amount has a negative impact on the winning 
bid price. 
H1a: As the purchase amount increases, the winning bid price 
decreases in repeated auctions.  
According to Bulow and Klemperer (1996), it is worthwhile for a 
seller to devote more resources to expanding the number of 
bidders than to identify the best mechanism to improve the 
performance of the auction. Many theoretical studies have noted 
that increasing the number of bidders will cause more serious 
competition among bidders and lead to a decrease of the bid price 
in reverse auctions (Smart and Harrison 2003, Tenorio 1993 and 
Hao 2000). This means the number of bidders significantly affects 
the auction performance, which means the winning bid price. 
Hence, we set hypothesis (H1b) to reconfirm the earlier theories.  
H1b: As the number of bidders increase, the winning bid price 
decreases in repeated auctions.  
Furthermore, we investigate the correlation among independent 
variables. In general, higher economic stakes motivate more 
suppliers to participate in the auctions (Jap 2007). Hence, it is 
hypothesized that purchase amount has a positive correlation with 
the number of participating bidders in the auction. 
H1c: The purchase amount has a positive correlation on the 
number of bidders in repeated auctions. 
4.1.2 Bidder Layer  
Fundamentally, the individual bidder’s bid price determines the 
auction’s winning price which is the procurement cost for the 
buyer. Therefore, each bidder’s bid pricing behaviour is modelled 
in the bidder layer.   
Chen (2008) shows that the increased volume decreases the bid 
price of each bidder in a group buying auction. Bichler and 
Kalagnanam (2006) and Hohner et al. (2003) apply the volume 
discount effect on their auction mechanism design in a 
procurement auction to decrease each bidder’s bid price. To 
identify the impact of purchase amount on each bidder’s bid price 
decision, we test the hypothesis (H2a) that the purchase amount 
has a negative impact on the bidder’s bid price. 
H2a: As the purchase amount increases, the bid price decreases 
in repeated auctions.  
In repeated auctions, bidders’ experiences in previous auctions 
affect the current auction’s bid price. Selten and Stoecker (1986) 
argued that learning direction theory holds in a repeated auction 
and this has been supported by many other studies (Neugebauer 
and Selten 2006, Selten et al. 2005). According to the theory, after 
a successful bid a subject tends to increase his bid, while after 
experiencing loss of an opportunity the subject tends to decrease 
his bid in a reverse auction. Goes et al.(2010) show that bid 
pricing behaviour is consistent with learning direction theory in 
sequential English auctions. However, in procurement auctions, 
the prediction is mixed. Fevrier (2003) shows numerically that the 
winner of the current auction should bid less aggressively than the 
loser in the subsequent auction in procurement. But Luton and 
McAfee (1986) suggest that the winner of the previous auction 
should bid aggressively in the next auction. In a repeated 
procurement auction, the supplier needs to win the auction 
continuously to secure sales (Pinker et al. 2007). Hence, we need 
to empirically explore the effect of the bidder’s previous auction 
experience in repeated procurement auctions. 
The most recent empirical study of the effect of previous auction 
results was conducted by Zhong and Wu (2006). They show that 
the information learned from the previous auction, such as the 
rank order of bid prices and lowest winning bid, has a significant 
impact on the suppliers’ next bid. Studying only two consecutive 
auctions may not be enough to investigate bidders’ pricing 
behaviour in the case of multiple repeated auctions.  
To generalize the measure considering the previous winning rate, 
we adopt each bidder’s winning rate for the last r auctions, which 
is denoted as Winning_Record(r), or WR(r) in short. In this study, 
we define r as the level of patience of each bidder in repeated 
auction. Since each individual bidder may have different level of 
patience, we seek the r value of each individual bidder. The r 
value can be derived by the correlation level between current bid 
price and the previous auctions’ winging results. 
According to the learning direction theory, some bidders may 
increase their bid prices, if they have a high winning rate in 
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previous auctions to gain a margin in the current auction. We 
name this kind of bidders Margin Seekers and they can be 
classified as traditional risk takers. Others may decrease their bid 
price to improve the chance of winning auctions continuously, so 
this kind of bidder are Win Seekers and they correspond to 
traditional risk averse bidders. The remaining bidders may be 
indifferent to their past winning record in deciding their current 
bid price, thus can be called as Neutral Bidders. With the 
perspective of three bidder types, we study the effect of past 
winning record on the current bid price. We define that 
Winning_Record(r) has a different impact on the bid price 
depending upon the bidder type. We can identify the type of each 
individual bidder according to this perspective. 
H2b: The bidder’s previous auction experience has an impact on 
the bid price in the current auction. 
H2b(i): The bidder is a margin seeker, if the bid price increases 
while the previous auctions’  winning record(r) increases. 
H2b(ii): The bidder is a win seeker, if the bid price decreases 
while the previous auctions’  winning record(r) increases. 
H2b(iii): The bidder is a neutral bidder, if the bid price is not 
correlated with  the previous auctions’ winning record(r)  
 
4.2 Empirical Analysis Results 
The sample auction data for the empirical study of bid pricing 
model consists of 102 auctions with 366 bids from 29 bidders. 
Descriptive statistics of key variables are summarized in Table 3.  
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
฀  Min Max Average Standard deviation 
Winning 
bid price  
(unit: Won) 
1,060 1,507  1,349.38 102.44 
Bid price  
(unit: Won) 1,060 1,690 1,373.06 99.35 
Number of 
bidders 
2 8 3.59 1.67 
Purchasing 
amount  
(unit: ream) 
500 840,000 30,564.12 114,845.88 
 
4.2.1 Analysis Results: Auction Layer 
To test the hypothesis in the auction layer, 102 auction data are 
used for the test and the unit of purchase amount is set as one 
ream. For the hypothesis (H1) test, we use a multivariate 
regression model to determine the relationship among the 
independent variables and dependent variable as expressed in 
equation (1).   
Winning Bid price = a0 + a1*Purchase Amount  
      + a2*Number of Bidders                                      (1) 
The results of the multivariate regression are summarized in Table 
4.  
 
 
Table 4. Multivariate regression results: Auction Layer 
Dependent 
variables 
Independent variables 
Intercept Amount Number of bidders 
Winning bid 
price 1,476.03** -0.003** -33.01** 
Adjusted R 0.421 2 
* p<0.1 **p<0.05 
According to the results in Table 4, H1a and H1b are supported. 
Both the increased amount and number of bidders significantly 
decrease the winning bid price. This implies that the new 
mechanism to maintain higher number of bidders will be critical 
to keep the procurement price low. 
The hypothesis H1c tests the effect of purchase amount on 
number of participants. The result of correlation analysis indicates 
that the purchase amount has a significant positive correlation 
with the number of participants (correlation coefficient = 0.23, 
p<0.01). In a multivariate regression, the multicollinearity 
problem can occur when there is a correlation among independent 
variables. In this case, there is a correlation between the amount 
and number of bidders. To verify multicollinearity, we use the 
VIF (Variation Inflation Factor); all independent variables’ VIF 
value is less than 10 which implies the model does not suffer from 
the multicollinearity problem. 
4.2.2 Analysis Results: Bidder Layer  
Among the 366 bidding data, only the 222 data (60%) from 6 
repeated bidders are used for the test of the bidder layer because 
the research purpose is to analyse the bid price model of repeated 
bidders. To test hypotheses H2a and H2b in category level, we use 
a multivariate regression model as expressed in equation (2).  
Bid price = b0 + b1*Purchase Amount + b2
Before we run the multivariate regression model, we first need to 
find the level of patience. Winning records of the last eighth 
auctions are considered as the candidate for the level of 
considering past auctions: Winning_Record(1), 
Winning_Record(2),…, Winning_Record(8). For instance, 
Winning_Record(2) means the bidder considers average winning 
rate of the last 2 auctions. To discover patience level r, we analyse 
the correlation of Winning_Record(r) with the current bid price as 
shown in Table 5.  
*Winning_ Record(r)                           
(2) 
Table 5. Correlation coefficient between current bid price and 
the average winning rate in the last r auctions 
 
As shown in Table 5, the last auction’s winning record, WR(1) is 
not significantly correlated with the bid price of current auction. 
WR(2) is correlated with bid price significantly and the 
correlation coefficient decreases and p value increases as r is 
increased. The results are consistent with the argument of Zhong 
(2007) that bidders have a short memory in learning in repeated 
auctions. Hence, we choose WR(2) to analyze the previous 
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auction results’ effect on bid price. The correlation coefficient has 
a negative value and by fitting the bid price and WR(2), we found 
the bid price decrease as WR(2) increases along the auctions. 
Therefore, the average behaviour of repeated bidders at the A4 
item level can be classified as a Win Seeker.  
To verify multicollinearity, we also use the VIF (Variation 
Inflation Factor). All independent variables’ VIF values are less 
than 10. The results of the multivariate regression are summarized 
in Table 6.  
Table 6. Multivariate regression results: Item level 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent Variables 
Intercept Amount WR(2) 
Bid Price 1399.12** -0.00025** -42.86** 
Adjusted R 0.06 2 
* p<0.1 **p<0.05 
According to the results in Table 6, H2a and H2b are supported. 
In H2a, an increased amount causes a significant decrease of the 
bid price. In H2b, the repeated bidders in A4 items are Win 
Seekers and they have a tendency toward risk aversion to secure 
sales in repeated procurement, contrary to the learning direction 
theory. But the behaviour of individual bidder may vary. 
 
Each bidder may have different level of patience. Each bidder’s 
level of patience is analyzed and the results are summarized in 
Table 7. 
Table 7. Maximum correlation coefficients between the 
current bid price and past r winning rates 
 
* p<0.1 
According to case of bidder A, its current bid price is most 
significantly correlated with WR(8) positively. This implies he is 
a very patient bidder. However, a bidder A is not a Margin Seeker 
because the bid price increases as the winning rate increases, and 
vice versa. Bidders B, E, and F, on the other hand, have negative 
correlation and they are Win Seeker.  Bidder C and D are risk 
neutral because there is no significant correlation. This confirms 
that each bidder have different bid pricing behaviour. 
 
5. SUSTAINABLE AUCTION 
MECHANISM FOR REPEATED 
AUCTIONS 
As noted earlier, 17% of bidders are repeated bidders who cover 
71% of all bids. Furthermore there are a limited number of new 
entrants in the MRO market. Hence, retaining existing bidders is 
critical to maintain the auction market’s competitiveness. 
However, 30% of repeated bidders become inactive under the 
traditional auction mechanism in repeated auctions. Repeated 
bidders who bid competitively but win less than they expected 
have a high possibility of becoming inactive. Keeping the number 
of bidders also significantly affects the bid price which will 
determine the procurement cost of the auctioneer. In repeated 
auction, the auction mechanism needs to provide incentives to 
maintain competitive bidders to join the auction repeatedly to 
increase the auction performance along the auctions.  
Despite the prevalence of repeated procurement auctions in 
business practice, there have been few attempts at designing a 
sustainable auction mechanism for repeated procurements.  
In order to have sustainability in repeated procurement, the 
underlying auction mechanism needs to help the auctioneer to 
maintain a number of competitive bidders for each auction over 
time. Keeping a sufficient number of bidders is critical to lower 
the bid price of each participating bidder and eventually to 
decrease the procurement cost for the auctioneer. For this purpose, 
an auction mechanism should motivate the bidders to join future 
auctions repeatedly. In particular, losing bidders with relatively 
competitive bid prices in previous auctions must be incentivized 
to compete in future auctions; otherwise they will drop out (Lee 
and Szymanski 2007). Through the provision of incentives, the 
auctioneer will reap the benefits of the price advantage by 
preventing competitive bidders from dropping out of the future 
auctions. 
To increase and maintain the number of bidders in repeated 
auctions, Colombo (2003) suggests compensating losing bidders 
as much as the cost of their bid preparation. The rationale is that 
the compensation will entice firms who have only marginal 
chances of winning to enter the auction so that the auctioneer will 
be able to attract more marginal bidders and drive down the price. 
However, in the large scale B2B procurement exchanged, it is not 
straightforward to decide whom to compensate and how much to 
compensate. Supporting the bidders whose bid price are always 
uncompetitive would be wasteful. Moreover, compensation may 
generate fake bidders who may participate in auctions only to 
capture the subsidy. Good news with online B2B auctions is that 
the bid preparation cost in for online auctions has become very 
low. Thus this compensation scheme may not be considered. 
Park et al. (2008) presented a preliminary study on the design of a 
new auction mechanism for repeated auctions. They proposed an 
incentive mechanism based on a bidder’s previous bidding prices 
and winning results. The incentive mechanism provides greater 
winning opportunity to bidders who have bid at relatively 
competitive prices but have won comparatively less in the past 
auctions. The incentive score is systematically calculated based on 
the bidder’s previous bid price and winning record. Consequently, 
the incentive mechanism will motivate competitive bidders to join 
more auctions and it will ultimately decrease the auctioneer’s 
purchase cost. Hence, the proposed mechanism would increase the 
expectation of continuity between buyers and suppliers, which is 
one of the key factors for successful buyer-supplier relationships. 
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Few studies have attempted to develop a sustainable mechanism 
for repeated auctions. As the adoption of auctions in procurement 
increases, the comprehensive research for creation of sustainable 
auction mechanism for repeated procurement becomes more 
important to reap the benefits of repeated auctions.   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Auctions play key roles in B2B procurement, especially with the 
growth of the Internet. In procurement auctions, repetition is a 
common nature. In this paper, we have empirically investigated 
what has transpired in repeated procurement auctions and have 
obtained valuable insights for the auctioneer to enhance the 
procurement performance of repeated auctions.  
Through the empirical analysis with IMK data, we discovered the 
followings. First, we found that repeated bidders (17% of all 
bidders) submit 71% of all bids. As such, the Pareto principle is 
applied to repeated auctions. We also confirmed that there is a 
limited number of new entrants in the repeated procurement 
market. Hence, retaining repeated bidders is critical to keep the 
auction market competitive. Second, repeated bidders tend to 
become inactive when their winning chance is low. Thirty percent 
of repeated bidders become inactive due to a low winning rate. 
This eventually results in an increase of bid price and procurement 
cost. Finally, we analyzed bid pricing behavior. We found that 
purchasing amount and number of bidders significantly influence 
the winning bid price of the auction. Since the number of bidders 
influences the winning bid price most significantly, the auctioneer 
needs to maintain a sufficient number of bidders during repeated 
auctions to keep the procurement cost lower. In bidder layer, 
purchase amount and bidder’s winning rates in the previous 
auctions influence the bid price in the repeated auction setting. 
The repeated bidders as a group may be regarded Win Seeker, 
however we confirmed that individual bidders have different risk 
behavior. 
In the IMK case, 17% of bidders participated in auctions 
repeatedly and covered most of the bids. During the six years of 
repeated auctions, 30% of them left the auction and never returned. 
Moreover, there were few new entrants. Therefore, the auctioneer 
needs to design incentive mechanism in order to retain 
competitive repeated bidders as long as the cost of the incentive 
does not exceeds the price reduction effect. Few studies have 
attempted to give an incentive to bidders to motivate them to join 
more auctions, and thus more comprehensive research for this 
problem is needed.  
There are limitations to this research. We need to confirm whether 
our findings can be extended to other items and other sourcing 
portals. In this study, the data are bounded by the available data in 
the auction market. In future study, the bidder’s bid price model 
need to be extended to other MRO items and data analysis in other 
items is in progress. Even though using the real prices does not 
make sense because the product specifications evolve and vary, 
we can use the relative prices for the winning price model. This 
study is conducted as the next phase of study. Furthermore, the 
behavior model of individual bidder for all bidders of the entire 
items needs to be analyzed to identify the bidders risk behaviors 
in the real world. 
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